Introduction
Accusations of fraud and electoral skullduggery seem an ever-present component of democratic process. Although things may have not changed much historically, today at least regardless of whether voting concerns Florida or Tehran, Ohio or Kyiv, South Carolina or Moscow, the winners rejoice, whereas the losers claim foul. And with even the most corrupt and autocratic regimes seeking the mantra of democratic legitimacy, it seems as if election observer is now a full-time job. The difficulty, though, with achieving a conclusive assessment of an election on the basis of direct observation is that regimes can, as Russia's did in 2008, erect formidable administrative barriers that render any objective and viable oversight an impossibility; or, as occurred in Ukraine in 2004, both sides of a conflict can field their own cadre of observers asserting or denying fraud, whereas the rest of us are left to debate who to believe. Indeed, with observers subject to the accusation that they operate with political agendas beyond encouraging free and fair elections, we can appreciate the necessity for developing statistical tools and indicators that when applied to official returns, both augment the findings and conclusions of first-hand observation and guide further investigations into an election's legitimacy.
The search for objective methods using the data provided by a state's election commission began, perhaps, with the late Sobyanin and Suchovolsky's (1993) analysis of Russia's 1993 parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum. But although several of the indicators of fraud he proposed have subsequently been refined and extended as valuable tools, one indicator in particular reveals the dangers of this enterprise. Here Sobyanin took note of an empirical relationship that pertains to an interestingly wide range of phenomena. Specifically, suppose we take the variable X, where X i measures the population of city i, the sales of corporation i, the energy of subatomic particle i, or even the population of insect species i, suppose X 1 > X 2 > . . . > X n , and suppose we graph log(X i ) against the rank i. Then for the variables cited, the necessarily negatively sloped relationship is nearly perfectly approximated by a straight line. Applying this idea to the absolute votes won by the several parties in Russia's 1993 proportional representation parliamentary elections held alongside its constitutional referendum, Sobyanin interpreted the deviations from a linear relationship as an indicator of fraud's magnitude.
The problems here should be obvious. If voters are sophisticated and strategic and if parties must meet some threshold of representation, then we can anticipate a nonlinear drop in the vote shares of parties that are not expected to win seats. Similarly, if Duverger's law holds in single mandate contests, then an even more pronounced discontinuity in shares will appear among all parties that rank third or lower. Indeed, it is precisely relationships of this type that Cox (1997) formally generalizes for a range of electoral systems, which is to say that there are good theoretical reasons for supposing that a log-linear relationship will not hold in a free and fair election. The search for a readily applied indicator of fraud did not, of course, end with Sobyanin, and the quest for an easily applied forensic tool with the attendant statistical and mathematical rigor is part of the attraction of recent applications of Benford's Law to elections. However, here we argue that this ''law'' is no less suspect as a means for detecting electoral fraud than is Sobyanin's adaptation of the log-rank model.
We emphasize the importance of not only finding appropriate statistical tools for detecting and measuring fraud but also, from the perspective of the discipline as a whole, the importance of getting it right wherein our research is set on a sound theoretical foundation. Again, if we judge things by the proliferation of Web sites and Internet blogs, the application of Benford's Law to elections is now an important part of political science's public face. Unfortunately, the ''research'' offered is anything but peer reviewed. This essay, then, can be interpreted as an assessment of the conclusions that might apply were peer review a part of this component of the discipline's public persona. We begin in the next section, then, with a brief review of Benford's Law and a discussion of the need for theory linking it to elections and electoral fraud. In Section 3, we turn to some simulations wherein we evaluate the Law's performance when applied to artificial data generated in accordance with the standard spatial model of party competition in which fraud is wholly absent followed by an assessment of the Law's value when votes are transferred fraudulently from one candidate to the other in this artificial data. This section, then, can be interpreted as an assessment of the Law's propensity, in the abstract, to commit Type 1 and Type 2 errors, respectively-to signal fraud when there is none and to signal a free and fair vote when there is fraud. However, rather than rely exclusively on artificial data, in Sections 4 and 5, we apply the Law to data from Ukraine's 2004 presidential vote and its 2007 parliamentary contest. We emphasize that the choice of Ukraine and of these two elections is not a mere convenience. For reasons we elaborate later, both elections constitute a virtually perfect controlled social science experiment for assessing indicators of electoral malfeasance. This analysis of Ukraine is then followed, in Section 6, with an assessment of Russia's most recent presidential contest in 2008. The utility of using this data for assessing Benford's Law is that we have good priors as to where fraud is most likely to have occurred and where it is likely to be absent of at least muted.
Benford's Law
Briefly, Benford's Law states (or, rather, observes) that a number of processes or measurements give rise to numbers (e.g., returns on investment, population of cities, street addresses, sales of corporations, heights of buildings) that establish patterns in the digits that might otherwise seem counterintuitive wherein lower digits are more common than larger ones. Although we might expect digits to be uniformly (randomly) distributed when there is no hidden nefarious hand generating the numbers that contain them, suppose, for the simplest example, that we invest $100 and that our investment doubles every year. If we now record the value of that investment every month, our first 12 observations will begin with the digit ''1,'' our next seven with the digit ''2,'' our next four with the digit ''3,'' and so on. Thus, a graph of the distribution of first digits will look like a log-normal density. Alternatively, if we collect home street numbers at random from a telephone book because nearly all streets begin with the number ''1'' (or 10 or 100) and since renumbering will occur when a street crosses a municipal boundary or simply ends before numbers beginning with higher digits appear, addresses will more often begin with a ''1'' than a ''2,'' more often with a ''2'' than a ''3'' and so on.
The processes in these examples that give rise to sequences of first digits that approximate Benford's Law are self-evident and statistically significant deviations from it can be taken as evidence that someone has ''cooked the books'' or employed an unusual algorithm for numbering residences. Not a little effort has been devoted, then, to formalizing that law mathematically and uncovering less obvious and more general mechanisms of number generation that would yield conformity to it in other contexts (Janvresse and la Rue 2004) . Formally, Benford's Law can be expressed thus: The probability that the digit d (d 5 0, 1, . . ., 9) arises in the nth (n > 1) position is P Thus, for processes thought to match Benford's Law, Table 1 gives the predicted frequencies for both the first and second digits (referred to as the 1BL and 2BL models):
In the realm of election forensics, it is these predictions that we see widely applied on a variety of Web sites when the author wishes to argue the some election was free or fraudulent. Of course, the Web is hardly the place to judge an indicator's veracity since the authors of those sites often have political agendas that render any conclusion suspect. On the other hand, we can assume that those analyses take their inspiration from a more academic literature that attempts to rest the application of Benford's Law to elections on a more scientific footing (see especially Mebane 2006 , 2008 , Mebane and Kalinin 2009 , Buttorf 2008 . It is this literature that we address here.
First, though, we should note that for wholly plausible reasons, Mebane (2009) argues for abandoning any focus on the first digit of election data. The argument, in its simplest form, is perhaps best illustrated by Brady's (2005) observation that if a competitive two candidate race occurs in districts whose magnitude varies between 100 and 1000, the modal first digit for each candidate's vote will not be 1 or 2 but rather 4, 5, or 6. This example, though, also points to a general problem with applications of 2BL to elections, namely there does not yet exist any model-any theory-that compels us to believe that manipulated vote tallies lead us away from the predictions of the Law and that a free and fair vote yields data consistent with a 2BL distribution. Correspondingly, there is little in the way of analysis and theory to tell what parameters we need to assess in determining the Law's relevance or irrelevance.
Two examples illustrate what we mean here. The first, which we can discuss only briefly owing to its technical nature, is the analysis by Ijiri and Simon (1977) of the linear log-rank relationship applied to firm size-the same relationship Sobyanin sought to adapt to elections. Observing that a linear relationship appears to hold empirically in this specific context, Ijiri and Simon propose a formal model of investment and acquisition that predicts a relationship that approximately conforms to the log-rank hypothesis. Their model, though, does more than that. First, rather than a strictly linear relationship, it predicts a modestly concave one and the fact that the data precisely matches that deviation from a strictly linear fit gives credence to their assumptions. But second and more importantly, the precise nature of those assumptions in combination with their substantive interpretations, the things (e.g., government intervention and regulation) that would occasion deviations from the predicted concave relationship.
A second example illustrates a less formal type of theory we deem essential for evaluating any proposed forensic indicator of fraud. We refer here to the argument of Berber and Scacco (2008) for the relevance of looking at the last and next to last digits of vote tallies. They begin by noting that if there is little chance that the perpetrators of fraud fear prosecution even if detected (as is the case in contemporary Russia), it is not unreasonable to be suspicious of precinct or regional tallies that report a proportion of zeros and fives as the last digit in excess of what we expect by chance. Their ''theory'' here is simply the supposition that absent any legal disincentives for committing fraud, precinct and local election officials can meet their ''quotas'' and save effort by employing the simple heuristic of rounding off the numbers they report, presumably without regard to actual ballots cast. Indeed, it is precisely rounding of this sort that one finds in abundance in the turnout numbers of Russia's 2004 presidential elections (Buzin and Lubarev 2008 . And here we are reminded of the unintentionally humorous remark of Vladimir Shevchuk of Tatarstan's central election commission when commenting on Russia's 2000 presidential election that elevated Putin to prominence: ''there has been fraud of course, but some of it may be due to the inefficient mechanism used to count ballots . . . To do it the right way they would have needed more than one night. They were already dead tired so they did it in an expedient way'' (Moscow Times, September 9, 2000). Berber and Scacco, though, also confront the possibility that fraud's perpetrators will seek to disguise their actions, and here they note that if perpetrators attempt to do so by entering what they regard as random (but nevertheless, manipulated) numbers in official tallies, there is a considerable body of experimental evidence in behavioral economics to suggest (as a parallel to the gambler's fallacy) they will write repeated digits less frequently than what we expect by chance (Camerer 2003) . That is, protocol entries ending with the digits ''00,'' ''11,'' ''22,'' and so on should, in a fraud free election, occur a tenth of the time, and it is reasonable to be suspicious of protocols if observed frequencies are significantly less than this fraction (for the application of this test to a suspect election see Levin et al. 2009 ).
There are, of course, reasons for not relying exclusively on Berber and Scacco's proposed indicators. Among other things, we do not know whether we ought to look at vote totals for individual candidates or turnout figures. Also, we have no hypotheses to guide us if an analysis of digits yields one inference when looking at say candidate totals and the opposite inference when we examine turnout. Nevertheless, their idea does point the way toward a fuller theoretical explication of an analysis of digits grounded in alternative models of the heuristics people might follow when committing fraud in various contexts and forms. Ijiri and Simon's analysis, in turn, illustrates a more fully developed theory of a potential indicator wherein specific hypotheses can be tested to explain deviations from some formally predicted regularity.
In contrast, the relevance of Benford's Law to elections and its connection to specific forms of fraud await explication. The principle justification offered for its relevance rests on the finding that aggregates of numbers generated from different and uncorrelated random processes will, in the limit, fit the Law (Hill 1998; Janvresse and la Rue 2004). Mebane (2006) , in turn, argues for its relevance by asserting that voting derives from a sequence of stochastic choices-for whom to vote, whether to vote, errors invoting, and so on. Such verbal arguments, though, are a weak reed upon which to rest a test for democratic legitimacy. Among other things, it ignores the fact that fraud itself is often implemented in a highly decentralized way by local and regional officials, each using their own schemes, heuristics, and procedures-thereby adding yet another stochastic element to the mix and, arguably, encouraging an even closer fit to the Law. The fact is, unlike Berber and Scacco's analysis of last and next-to-last digits or Ijiri and Simon's model of investment and acquisitions, there is no corresponding behavioral or theoretical reason for supposing that the second digits of fraud free data will look any different from data drawn from an election permeated with instances of falsified votes and protocols (a potential exception here is Diekmann's (2010) experimental study of fraudulently generated statistical data). It may be that simulations of data that fit 2BL can be perturbed by falsifications of a specific sort (Mebane 2006 ), but that is no reason for believing that fraud free data itself will correspond to 2BL. Nor does it tell us when fraud might move official data closer in line with Benford's Law. Indeed, as we show shortly with both real and simulated data, that is precisely what can occur.
Some proponents of Benford's Law might argue that it should be employed only as one of several forensic tools. But in addition to noting those innumerable internet blogs that consider ONLY deviations from 1BL or 2BL (which is more a comment on the ''scholarship'' of those blogs than the legitimacy of the Law), we also see the Law's strongest proponents offering arguments that hint at viewing it as a virtual magic black box: Witness the assertion that ''. . . it does not require that we have covariates to which we may reasonably assume the votes are related across political jurisdictions. The method is based on tests of the distribution of the digits in reported vote counts, so all that is needed are the vote counts themselves'' (Mebane 2006, 1) . The statement is technically correct in terms of how the Law is applied and Mebane does qualifies things by stating that analyses employing 2BL might merely be used to flag suspicious data and augment on the ground observation and vote recounts. Nevertheless, any inference that the analysis of official returns can begin and end with Benford's Law or that we can dispense with measuring other variables such as the socioeconomic correlates of voting is unwarranted: Detecting and measuring fraud is much like any criminal investigation and requires a careful gathering of all available data and evidence in conjunction with a ''theory of the crime'' that takes into account substantive knowledge of the election being considered, including the geographic correlates of voting, the motives for committing fraud (which themselves might correlate with other observable variables), and the instruments at the disposal of those intent of falsifying the vote. In an ideal world, a ''theory of the crime'' in combination with this additional data would then be used, in combination with a theory relating the Law to free and fair elections, to ascertain its relevance and the deviations from it that might arise for wholly innocuous reasons. However, absent a clearly specified theory of how Benford's Law applies to election data-formal or otherwise-it is unclear how to make it a part of any ''criminal investigation.'' Indeed, the argument that follows is that as presently developed, the Law is suspect at best if not irrelevant as a forensic indicator: Deviations from it are as likely to signal fraud when there is none as it is to fail to signal fraud when it in fact exists. Our argument here, then, is that Benford's Law gives an unacceptably high chance of committing both Type 1 and Type 2 errors.
Simulations
Absent a theory that links Benford's Law to elections and specific models of fraud, there are essentially two ways to assess its value as an indicator: Simulations and its application to elections in which we are confident, a priori, that there was or was not significant fraud. Turning first, then, to simulation, the difficulty here is that unless the simulations are themselves grounded in some well-defined paradigm or conceptualization of elections, we cannot preclude the possibility of inadvertently selecting a structure that is somehow biased for or against a positive evaluation of things. This is all the more problematic here since, to repeat ourselves, the assumptions justifying the relevance of Benford's Law to elections remain unspecified-there is no proscribed model of an election with which to begin the generation of artificial data. Our approach then is to begin with what is perhaps the most widely used formal conceptualization of an election-the spatial model wherein voters are identified by ideal points in an Euclidean ''issue'' space, candidates take positions in that space, and voters vote (or abstain) for the candidate closest to their idea.
To simulate the data of a fraud-free election, we appreciate that there are a great many ways to proceed. We wish here, though, to proceed with as few assumptions as possible in order to insure a homogeneous electorate that yields a final vote count favoring one candidate or the other only because of the candidate's relative electoral strategies-in our case, their spatial positions relative to the electorate. We begin then with the usual Downsian model of an electorate in which eligible voters occupy positions in a twodimensional space, where, if they vote, they do so for the candidate closest to their ideal position. The positions of the candidates-point in that policy space-are then exogenously set to induce simulated elections of different degrees of competitiveness. Keep in mind, now, that aside from district size and the expected division of the vote between the candidates, the absolute values of several parameters (i.e., sseveral means and variances) hold no substantive meaning since spatial dimensions have no natural metric associated with them. Thus, to induce random and homogeneous preferences and turnout distributions, we formalize the spatial structure of our simulations by letting, for each voter i, The motivation for this structure is as follows: Suppose G denotes the mean personal incomes of the voting age population nationally. Thus, although we fix the national average, the mean income of each district, g, is drawn randomly from the distribution N(G, 0.15). Voter i's income, then, is a draw from the distribution N(g, 2.0). However, to accommodate the possibility that income impacts policy preferences differentially across districts owing to unobserved variables, we let b x be its ''impact'' in i's district. The randomly selected voter in question, i, will have the income V i drawn from a distribution that corresponds to his or her district, N(g, 0.15). The impact of that income on his or her position on issue X is then taken to be V i times b X, to which we add an additional random component so as to, in effect, spread voters out on issue X (note that the means of b X and b Y are different, set at 2 and -1, respectively, to allow for differential salience of the underlying social determinants of policy preferences on the two issues . . . which, in effect, ensures that our two-dimensional distribution of ideal points will not be radially symmetric).
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The parameters of interest now are district size and the winning candidate's margin of victory.
3 Our simulations, though, consist of two types. In the first type, we simulate an election by creating 1000 districts wherein each contains the same fixed number of eligible voters. Here we run several sequences of elections where every district contains 1000 eligible voters, elections where every district contains 10,000 voters, and elections where every district contains 20,000 voters. With respect to these numbers, we note that in the real world, we are generally at the mercy of election commissions and the level of aggregation with which they report data. For example, for data from places such as Russia and Ukraine, if it is available at the precinct level, we can access data in which the average number of eligible voters per observation equals 1000 (and, if we delete special districts, will typically vary between 200 and 2500 eligible voters). A similar variation is observed in most American states, whereas in Taiwan, precincts rarely exceed 500 eligible voters. On the other hand, the data available to us are often more highly aggregated and can range in size from 10,000 eligible voters on up to the adult population of entire provinces. Naturally, ''too great'' a level of aggregation undermines any hope of statistical reliability (e.g., if, in Ukraine, we are compelled to rely on formally defined election district data, we have at most 255 observations with virtually no opportunity to control for those things we can reasonably assume correlate with the likelihood of fraud such as percent urban (for a discussion of this issue in the Russian case, which applies to Ukraine as well, see Berezkin et al. 1999 Berezkin et al. , 2003 . And ''too low'' a level of aggregation, wherein the number of eligible voters per observation vary between, say, 1 and 500, confounds even 2BL since the second digit can be the last or next to last. In this case, if Berber and Scacco's (2008) hypothesis as to how fraud can impact last and next to last digits, we must assume that fraud will impact the fit with 2BL in unknown ways. Given these considerations, then, we let the size of ''precincts'' in our simulations take one of three values-1000, 10,000, or 20,000-with the assumption that if we are compelled to rely on observations that average more than 20,000 eligible voters, the level of aggregation is likely to be too great for a confident assessment of things using any methodology.
Our second series of simulations takes cognizance of the fact that precincts are rarely if ever of the same size and rarely is the distribution of sizes uniform or even normal. For example, for the two empirical cases, we examine in detail later-Ukraine and Russia-precincts vary generally between 100 and 2500 eligible voters, where precincts between, say, 100 and 500 eligible voters far outnumber those with between 500 and 1000 and precincts with between 500 and 1000 eligible voters are more common that those with between 1000 and 2500. In this second series of simulations, then, we allow the size of districts to be randomly distributed around means of 1000, 10,000, or 20,000, where each district is similar in the characteristics of the population, but where smaller districts are more common than larger ones. Specifically, we let the size of each district, S d , be generated by the function,
where S d is the number of eligible voters in the district, m is the mean district size, and e d is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 0.25 m.
Our second parameter, now, is the vote share of the winning candidate in a two-candidate contest. Here we let that share assume one of three values: 52%, 57%, and 66%. Both sets of simulations are then divided into two halves. The first half calculates the mean value of the second digit for both candidates using the data generated by the process just described. Data of this sort, though, allow us only to assess the hypothesis that 2BL can be used to identify a free and fair vote. To assess the opposite-the likelihood that Benford's Law will fail to signal detect fraud when it in fact exists requires that we introduce fraud of some sort into the analysis. Manipulations of the vote can, of course, take a variety of forms, including stuffed ballot boxes and stolen votes. To simplify things with a form that magnifies its effects, the second half of our simulations takes our fraud-free data and transfers a percentage of the second (losing) candidate's vote in each district to the first (winning) candidate. In our simulations, the percentage transferred varies across districts according to a uniform distribution between 0% and 30%. Thus, the winning candidate on average gains 15% of the minority candidate's vote.
The article's Appendix offers a complete set of the second-digit means generated by our simulations, including an accounting of statistical significance. Here we summarize that data from several perspectives, concluding that 2BL gains no support as an indicator of fraud. Table 2 begins this summary for the first half of our simulations-districts of fixed and uniform size-with an assessment of the extent to which observed second digits differ significantly from the 2BL value of 4.187. Our data here are organized by a three-way partition: size of districts (1k, 10k, and 20k), the candidates' vote shares (52-48, 55-45, and 66-34) , and the majority versus minority candidate. Each cell of this table, in turn, offers two numbers-the number of elections in which the mean value of the second digit is significantly different from 4.187 at the .01 level of significance (p values < .01) and the number that are not significant at this level. For example, then, with a 52/48 split in the vote and a district size of 10,000 eligible voters, two simulations yield mean second digits significantly different from 4.187 and three do not.
There are hints here that 2BL performs better when districts are small and when the election is competitive, but clearly 2BL is anything but a reliable indicator of a fraud free contest. Nearly 75% of all observed second-digit means are significantly different than 4.187 at the .01 level of confidence. And Table 3 , which matches the format of Table 1 , but now considers the corresponding simulations with fraud, provides little or no reason to alter this conclusion. Indeed, the overall number of average second digits significantly different from 4.187 drops from 80 to 72 despite the induced fraud. This is not to say that there are no patterns in Table 3 that proponents of Benford's Law might take in a positive light. For example, when election districts are ''small'' (i.e., 1k or 10k), the number of observed means significantly different than 4.187 for the majority candidate rises when moving from fair to fraudulent elections from 23 Of course, one can also ask if fraud at least moves the calculation of second-digit means in the ''right'' direction-ignoring tests of statistical significance (and in fact, as our Appendix shows, most changes are not significant) what share of means move further from 4.187 when fraud is introduced into our simulations? Table 4 answers this question where the first number in each cell corresponds to the number of means that move further from 4.187 and the second corresponds to the number that more closer to 4.187 with the introduction of fraud. For example, then, with a 52/48 split in the vote and districts each with 10,000 eligible voters, one simulation moves the calculated second-digit mean away from 4.187 in absolute terms, whereas 4 simulations move it closer. Table 4 reveals that 2BL's performance is appreciably better by this measure in close elections than in landslide victories. When the majority candidate wins but 52% of the vote, fraud moves the calculation of mean second digits closer to 4.187 in only 7 of 30 cases, whereas when the election is a 66%-34% landslide, fraud has the opposite effect on mean second digits. Nevertheless, the introduction of fraud across all our simulations here actually moves the mean value of second digits closer to 4.187 in a majority of cases (57 vs. 45). Of course, one might object to this assessment with the argument that requiring districts of equal size biases our numbers away from 2BL's value-that our simulations contain ''too much normality'' for Benford's Law to apply. Table 5, then, reproduces Table 2 , except than now we consider those simulations with variable district sizes-elections in which the sizes of districts are distributed exponentially. And, in fact, 2BL does less poorly here than with constant district sizes. Generally, although 80 of 102 (slightly less than 80%) calculated means are significantly different than 4.187 with constant district sizes, that number drops to 57 of 170 calculated means (or approximately 35%).
Labeling 35% of fraud-free elections as fraudulent is hardly the sought after characteristic we seek in a forensic indicator and is not one likely to carry much weight in the world of public opinion. Nevertheless, continuing with our assessment of things and examining the consequences of the introduction of fraud into our simulations here, Table 6 parallels Table 3 in its construction. For various cells here, 2BL appears to perform well. For example, with a 55 to 45 split in the vote and an average district size of 10k, 12 of 15 calculated means are significantly different from 4.187. But as good as this number might seem to proponents of Benford's Law, notice that if we turn to the losing candidate, ALL calculated second-digit means fail to differ significantly from 4.187. And overall, only 68 of 180 means depart significantly from 4.187. Thus, 102 of 170 simulated results give the wrong inference-the inference of a free and fair contest despite the fact that fully 15% of the losing candidate's vote has been transferred to the winning opponent. With exponentially distributed districts, then, Benford's Law can be said to commit the Type 1 error of incorrectly labeling a free and fair vote as fraudulent 34% of the time and the Type 2 error of labeling a fraudulent election as free and fair 60% of the time. None of this is to say that there might not be another simulated model of elections that would yield a better fit to 2BL nor can we preclude the possibility that there are forms of fraud other than the one we implement here wherein 2BL might perform better. Unfortunately, it is here that the absence of any welldefined theory connecting Benford's Law to elections undermines its relevance. With such a theory, we would know, as Ijiri and Simon illustrate with and explicit model linking firm size to a log-rank relationship, the magnitude of deviations from 4.187 that should concern us, the forms of fraud if any 2BL is likely to detect, and how its performance is impacted by such things as the election law, the presence or absence of strategic voting, and the number of competing parties or candidates. But absent a theoretical derivation of the law in an electoral context and absent an exploration of a potential infinity of alternative simulations and formalizations of fraud within them, proponents of Benford's Law ought minimally to be concerned that it does not appear to give reliable information when applied to data generated by a quite standard two-candidate spatial model and a rather straightforward formalization of fraud.
Ukraine 2004
Simulations provide but one basis for evaluating a quasi-theoretical idea; real-world data are a second venue that needs to be explored. And here there is perhaps no better source of data with which to evaluate an indicator of fraud than Ukraine's 2004 presidential election. Pitting two candidates, a Western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko against the pro-Russian Putin-backed Viktor Yanukovich (along with a variety of uncompetitive candidates), that election is as close to a controlled experiment as we are likely to find in the social sciences. Briefly, few plans were implemented for electoral skullduggery in the election's first (October) round since it was universally understood that no candidate would pass the 50% threshold and that the two Viktors would compete against each other in a (November) runoff for a politically and geographically divided electorate. And in conformity with public opinion polls, Yushchenko was officially credited with 39.90% of the vote, Yanukovich garnered 39.26%, and no other candidate won more than 6%. The November runoff was an altogether different story. Ukraine's Central Election Commission proclaimed Yanukovich the winner, awarding him 49.46% of the vote as compared to Yushchenko's 46.61% (a 1.2 million vote plurality), but the balloting was marred by any number of irregularities, including turnout rates in excess of 100% in Yanukovich's strongholds, university students claiming they were not allowed to mark their ballots except for Yanukovich, and precinct administrators who testified to their own stratagems for manipulating the vote on Yanukovich's behalf. Nearly immediately, upwards of a half million people took to the streets of Kyiv in a protest termed the Orange Revolution, demanding that Ukraine's Supreme Court invalidate the vote and require a second runoff. And here the critical piece of evidence the court could not ignore when it ruled the November vote invalid came, interestingly, from the offices of Yanukovich's primary sponsor, then incumbent President Leonid Kuchma. To allow the presidential administration to monitor the vote as the returns came in, a dual computer system was established whereby returns were sent simultaneously to the President's office as well as to Ukraine's Central Election Commission. However, as the person in charge of the President's half of that system, Chief Consultant to the Administration of the President Lyudmyla Hrebenyuk, testified, in mid-afternoon when trends indicated a victory for Yushchenko, 1.1 million votes mysteriously appeared for Yanukovich in the CEC's public accounting that did not register on the President's computers. Put simply, in addition to the countless instances of fraud in the form of coercion and manipulations at the local and precinct levels, the CEC simply manufactured over a million votes out of thin air in favor of Yanukovich with the documentary evidence of their actions in the files and computer hard drives of the President's office.
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Following Ms Hrebenyuk's testimony, with the Orange Revolution in full swing and with virtually all Western governments refusing to recognize the November result, the Supreme Court required a rerun of the runoff in December. At that point, a greatly embarrassed Putin withdrew his spin doctors from Kyiv, the composition of the CEC was reconstituted and countless members of Ukraine's diaspora poured into the country to monitor the second runoff-this time stationing themselves in those districts that had earlier produced the most evidently suspicious numbers. At the same time President Kuchma, no longer certain that he was in control of his country's varied security forces, signaled his neutrality and thereby freed regional political bosses and administrators from any obligation to manipulate the vote. The net effect of all this was to present students of election fraud with a nearly perfect social science experiment: A November vote that in an unambiguous way saw something between 5 and 10% of the vote falsified in favor of one specific candidate, followed by a second vote with the same two candidates, the same issues and the same voters but with the opportunities and incentives to engage in fraud greatly reduced if not wholly eliminated. Unsurprisingly, turnout in districts that had reported rates in excess of 100% in November saw their numbers drop to a more reasonable 70%-80%, both official and unofficial observers reported few if any irregularities and, in conformity with pre-election and exit polls, Yushchenko won the runoff 51.99% versus 44.20%.
It is these two votes that we and others use to assess the performance of a variety of indicators of fraud other than 2BL-distributions of turnout, the relationship between turnout and each candidate's share of the eligible electorate, econometric estimates of the flow of votes between elections, and the analysis of last and next-to-last digits. Here we note simply that all such indicators, in addition to having a formally well-defined link to detecting election fraud in the form of the non-homogeneities in the data occasioned by stolen votes, fictitious vote counts, and outright ballot box stuffing, are consistent with the hypothesis that the November balloting saw between 1.5 and 3 million suspect or explicitly fraudulent votes whereas there is essentially no evidence of fraud in the December runoff (Myagkov et al. 2009) . The question, then, is: What does 2BL tell us?
Taking official returns from Ukraine's 755 rayons (counties), if we look first at the numbers reported for the candidates, we find a mean value of 4.21 for both the first and second rounds in Yushchenko's votes, whereas the means for Yanukovich are 4.37 in the first (November) runoff and 4.28 in the December re-vote. Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that none of the November fraud impacted Yushchenko's vote and that the difference of 0.09 signals a less fraudulent second runoff on Yanukovich's behalf. However, we should keep in mind that Benford's Law does not tell us what numbers should be analyzed and that half or more of the fraud in November took the form of artificially inflated turnout-literally stuffed ballot boxes and falsified protocols-wherein no less than 1.5 million nonexistent voters were added to the count. A second-digit analysis of official turnout figures, though, would seem to contest this fact: The mean second-digit in the first runoff is 4.22 and increases to 4.39 in the December vote. In other words, if we draw any inferences at all from 2BL it is, contrary to all that we know about the election and despite all documented evidence to the contrary, the December re-runoff was more likely to be fraudulent than the November vote.
One might be tempted, of course, in defense of Benford's Law, to argue that the mean values just reported are sufficiently close to the 4.187 value dictated by 2BL so as to be, at worst, inconclusive and requiring additional analysis. As we well know, however, mean values near 4.187 can arise from any number of distributions, and thus, a graph of second-digit frequencies is perhaps more telling than a simple summary statistic. And, in fact, these frequencies reveal very little in the way of meaningful patterns or patterns that suggest any relevance of Benford's Law one way or the other. Figure 1a graphs Yushchenko's second and third-round second-digit distributions, Fig. 1b does the same for Yanukovich, and Fig. 1c does so for turnout across all election districts. Although it is true that ''0'' is the most frequently observed second digit for Yushchenko in the second round (and nearly so in the third), the next two most frequently observed digits are ''4'' and ''5.'' Yanukovich's third-round pattern does fit 2BL. But for turnout, despite the well-documented fraud that occurred, it is the second round and not the third that seems to fit 2BL best wherein the numbers ''0,'' ''1,'' and ''2'' are most common in the second round, but ''4'', ''5,'' and ''6'' capture that honor in the third. In fact, detecting meaningful patterns in any of these distributions seems akin to seeing cats, dogs, and cows in clouds.
Ukraine 2007
If Ukraine's 2004, presidential election was the near-perfect social science experiment, the country's 2007 parliamentary vote is perhaps an even better basis for evaluating a forensic tool. Here we not only know of the existence of fraud, we also know its approximate magnitude and precise form. Although the election received high marks from international observers for meeting the standards of free and fair, one region nevertheless fell under suspicion-Donetsk, which is Yanukovich's home region and the center of support of his party, The Party of Regions. By way of understanding the motives for fraud, we note that following the 2006 parliamentary vote, Yanukovich resurrected himself as head of Regions to become Prime Minister by forming a coalition government with the Communists and Oskar Moroz's Socialists. And although the Communists were Yanukovich's natural allies, the participation of the Socialists in his coalition came as a rude shock to Yanukovich's opponents since Moroz had thrown in his lot with the Orange Coalition in 2004. However, opposed to Yushchenko's goal of securing NATO membership and denied the lucrative post of Speaker of the Parliament, Moroz performed an about face and, accepting the label 'traitor' in Western Ukraine, sided with Yanukovich.
Moroz's switch in allegiance and Yanukovich's subsequent ability to thwart Yushchenko's agenda led the President to dissolve parliament and call for new elections in 2007 with well-defined strategies for the competing sides. For Yushchenko is was to maintain one's support in the West, pick up those voters who had previously supported Moroz, and pursue incremental gains in the East. Yanukovich's strategy was equally clear: Hold onto one's traditional support, do nothing to undermine the Communists, and facilitate Moroz's campaign in the East. Most critically, Yanukovich's ability to remain Prime Minister hinged on whether Moroz's Socialists would exceed the 3% threshold for representation which at a minimum was worth 15 of 450 parliamentary seats. The chances of sustaining his coalition, then, depended on whether the Socialists could make up in the East the losses they were certain to incur in Western Ukraine. However, as the votes were counted it became evident that the Socialists would fall short of the mark-that voters who might have approved of the Socialist's switch to Yanukovich preferred nevertheless to cast their ballots for either the Communists or Regions. Put simply, voters were rational: A vote for the Socialists was an uncertain option. Although a vote for them signaled support for Yanukovich, if the party failed to pass the threshold for representation, the vote was wasted. For those who supported Yanukovich and his coalition, then, it was better to cast one's ballot for Regions or the Communists, both of which were certain to pass the threshold. It was at this point, in late afternoon, that the flow of precinct vote counts from Donetsk suspiciously stopped and when they resumed they reported an improbably high level of support for Moroz's Socialists-in many instances, support that exceeded Regions by factors of 5 and 10.
Subsequent analysis of the returns leave little doubt that, in the attempt to push the Socialists past the 3% threshold, rather than simply manufacture votes for the Socialists (and be caught red-handed, as in 2004, with reported turnout rates in excess of 100%), something between 100,000 and 160,000 votes were simply subtracted in a subset of precincts in Donetsk from the totals reported for Regions and awarded to the Socialists (Myagkov et al. 2009, 210-20) . Put simply, in approximately 350 of Donetsk's 2455 precincts, ballots marked for Regions were put in the Socialist pile. This tactic has a clear logic under PR: Although the loss of even 160,000 votes might cost Regions a seat or two, the coalition would gain the 15 seats of the Socialists if the party inched past the threshold. This effort failed, of course, because Yanukovich's minions realized too late that voters in Eastern Ukraine were not offsetting the Socialist's losses in the West.
approximately 5%-10% of the support for Regions, but upwards of 80% of that for the Socialists. The question, then, is whether Benford's Law detects this fraud. More to the point, although we might expect the returns for Regions in Donetsk to continue to match the predictions of 2BL since fraud impacted its numbers only slightly and then only in a subset of precincts, we can hardly expect the same of the Socialists. Interestingly, though, we find precisely the opposite. After eliminating precincts in which a party wins fewer than 100 votes, the mean second digit for Regions is 3.66, whereas for the Socialists it is 4.08. That is, the data for the Socialists better fit 2BL than does that for Regions. 6 Thus, although Benford's Law suggests substantial fraud on behalf of Regions in Donetsk, it gives essentially a clean bill of health to the Socialists, which we know it not the case. If we deem fraud on the order of 10% as insignificant when compared to 80%, we might even say that in Donetsk, Benford's Law commits both Type 1 and Type 2 errors simultaneously-offering the incorrect inference of a free and fair vote in the case of the Socialist tally and the inference of a fraudulent vote for the less perturbed tally of Regions. . Such numbers would have us believe that the mujahideen descended from their mountain hideaways disguised as babushkas to cast votes for a regime committed to killing them. Alternatively, one can look to the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan who report levels of support nearly as extreme as Chechnya 7 and where we can readily find election districts (rayons) in which nearly all precincts report turnout rates of 100% with 100% of the vote supporting Putin or Medvedev. Finally, we have the Islamic Republic of Ingushetia (Chechnya's neighbor), which in 2004, reported a turnout of 96.2% with Putin credited with an amazing 98.2% of the ballots cast. However, shortly after the election, the Web site of dissident Magomed Yevloyev conducted a survey of the electorate (where respondents were required to confirmed their answers by giving their internal passport numbers) in which roughly half of those interviewed (n ffi 50,000) confirmed that they had not voted. Although such methodology can hardly be taken as decisive evidence of fraud, we note that shortly thereafter, Yevloyev had the misfortune of returning to Ingushetia on the same plane as the republic's Kremlin-appointed president, whereupon he was arrested and placed in handcuffs at the airport. Mysteriously (or rather, miraculously), the official police report states that he freed himself on the drive to the capitol and, while wrestling for a gun, succeeded in shooting himself several times in the head, only to then have his body fall from the car as it proceeded on (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7590719.stm).
The advantages of looking at Russia as a test of any election forensic tool, though, does not derive simply from knowing that fraud occurred. Rather, it lies in the fact that fraud is not uniformly distributed across the country and we know where it is most prevalent on the basis of prior analyses, first-hand testimony, and the logic of political opportunities and incentives. Insofar as those incentives are concerned, with both political and economic control of the regions now centered in the Kremlin and with Putin having dispensed with regional executive elections in favor of direct Kremlin appointment, regional 6 One might conjecture that the low mean for Regions derives from peculiarities in the size of precincts. That is true in a complex way.
If we isolate those 1841 smaller districts in which Regions' vote lies between 100 and 1000, the mean second digit shoots up to 4.43 whereas for the remaining 530 larger precincts, its second-digit score drops to 1.00 (a comparable reanalysis for the Socialists changes nothing since it secured 1000 or more votes in only 11 of the 353 districts in which it won more than 100 votes). 7 In 2004, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan reported turnout of 83.0% and 89%, respectively, whereas in 2008 those numbers were little changed at 83.0% and 90%. In 2004, Putin was awarded 86.55% and 91.8% of the vote in these two republics, respectively, whereas Medvedev's reported totals declined slightly to 79.2% and 88.0%. bosses are, in effect, caught in a game much like a Prisoners' Dilemma with its dominant strategy: Regardless of the actions of anyone else, each must not merely show fealty to the center but must, as best they can, show no less support than the next boss. To act otherwise is to endanger one's position and even opens the door to criminal prosecution. Thus, for the same motives that the NKVD exceeded the Kremlin's targets by a factor of five for the killing of ''kulaks'' in 1937 ''kulaks'' in (Snyder 2010 , with everyone knowing that no one is prosecuted for encouraging, facilitating or engaging in fraud, provided only that it benefits the powers that be in Moscow, regional bosses have little incentive to ensure a free and fair vote and every incentive to act otherwise.
Of course, regional bosses do not all enjoy the same authority in their domains: Some control all media, whereas others do not; some control the industrial enterprises that dominate a region's economy, whereas others do not; some have held political control of their regions since before the fall of the Soviet Union, whereas others are recent appointments, and some have an ideological predisposition to supporting Putin, whereas others do not. The 2008 election also added an additional wrinkle that mediated the degree of electoral support expected by the Kremlin. Although the Kremlin sought a landslide victory for Medvedev, Putin arguably did not want his protégé to exceed the vote share he was awarded in 2004.
8 Thus, Putin's numbers in 2004 set an upper bound for each region and to fall short of that target in any significant way in 2008 was likely to endanger a one's position, whereas to exceed it would doubtlessly earn a reprimand.
We also have good ideas as to which bosses are best positioned to control the vote count, namely those who control Russia's ethnic republics-the ''usual suspects'' from the 1990's on have consistently been the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Mordovia.
9 This is not to say that fraud does not occur elsewhere, but its magnitude in the form of official tallies that bear little or no relationship to actual ballots cast is unlikely to be exceeded in other regions.
10 Put simply, any forensic indicator that suggests that the above mentioned regions are not the prime suspects in fabricated vote counts or that gives them a clean bill of health with respect to electoral fraud runs afoul of what we know substantively about contemporary Russian politics. This, however, is precisely what 2BL would lead us to believe. Looking first at the precinct level returns for Medvedev in 2008 (since the vote counts for other candidates yield numbers that too infrequently entail more than two digits), and calculating the average of the second digit by region, Figure 2 gives the overall distribution of second-digit averages across all of Russia's regions (as before, we eliminate all precincts in which Medvedev receives fewer than 100 votes). What we see here is a distribution that, despite variations in district sizes and the number of precincts in each (varying between 53 to 3301, with an average of 1020), largely corresponds to the national seconddigit average of 4.081-or slightly lower than the 2BL prediction of 4.187. Although such a difference, given the large number of precincts (n 5 85,526), might be cause for suspicion, it is unlikely to convince anyone that much was amiss in Russia's 008 vote. Indeed, were we to have no other information about Russia and no other forensic evidence, we would most likely be unwilling to reject the hypothesis that its 2008 vote was wholly free, fair, and absent significant fraud.
However, looking at things more closely, notice that Fig. 2 revels the great variety of numbers that a second-digit calculation generates, which is consistent with the supposition that a national average disguises considerable variation in the quality and legitimacy of vote counts. Thus, we must ask whether the components of this distribution match what we know about the country's political geography. And it is here that Benford's second-digit ''law'' falls woefully short with both Type 1 and Type 2 errors. Specifically, suppose we rank order the regions by the extent to which they depart from the 2BL number of 4.187. In this case, the ranks of the ''usual suspects'' are as follows: One might argue that the inclusion of St Petersburg on this list should not be deemed incredible since it is Putin's home district (although we can argue that St. Petersburg is an unlikely locus of significant fraud). But consider the fact that for the seven ''usual suspects,'' Medvedev's average vote was 89.4% (with an average turnout of 90.9%) whereas for the six regions that yield the greatest deviation from 2BL, Medvedvev's vote averaged slightly less than 70% (with an average turnout of approximately 77%). Thus, were we to take the calculation of second-digit means at face value, we might conclude that there was fraud, but in the form of millions of ballots for Medvedev that were wholly discarded or given to opposing candidates. If there is a hypothesis in political science to which we can assign a zero prior, it is that one.
Conclusions
Our earlier critique of Sobyanin's application of the log-rank model to elections is not based on its performance in Russia's 1993 Constitutional referendum. Indeed, we might say that this application illustrates a ''Type 3'' error-corroborating the correct hypothesis for the wrong reasons. Although there surely was some fraud in the 1993 vote (Yeltsin's tailor-made constitution could not be ratified unless turnout exceeded 50% and there is evidence to suggest that votes were manufactured in various regions to satisfy that requirement), the log-rank model was rejected as a forensic tool for theoretical reasons. Conversely, the model gained acceptance in a different context because Ijiri and Simon (1977) that absent a theoretical basis for assuming otherwise, generalized statements of empirical relationships that apply in one context cannot be transported to other contexts willy-nilly. With respect to Benford's Law, we know some of the conditions that, if satisfied, yield numbers in accordance with it, but just as there is no basis for supposing that the Ijiri-Simon model of firm size or an empirical relationship that holds for insects and city sizes applies to parties, candidates or anything else political, there is no reason to suppose a priori that the conditions sufficient to occasion digits matching 2BL necessarily hold any meaning for elections. Indeed, if Ijiri and Simon's model provides any guidance-and we note again that they focus on a specific process with specific assumptions and that their model does not predict a strictly linear relationship between log and rank, but rather a slightly convex one-it, in combination with what we know about the stochastic processes sufficient to yield digits in conformity with Benford's Law, is that the Law is not universally applicable magic box into which we plug election statistics and out of which comes an assessment of an election's legitimacy. This is not to say it is fruitless to search for special electoral contexts in which 2BL has some relevance, but our analysis suggests that the data required to validate that relevance must be richer than simple election returns.
We can illustrate what we mean here with another indicator proposed by Sobyanin that, unlike the log-rank model, has been refined to become a valuable forensic tool. Briefly, Sobyanin noted that, absent fraud in the form of artificially inflated turnout, the relationship in otherwise homogeneous data between turnout, T, and a candidate's share of the eligible electorate, V/E, should match the candidate's overall share of the vote. Thus, if we estimate V/E 5 a 1bT, then absent fraud and unobserved variables that correlate with both T and V, a should approximately equal 0 and b should approximate the candidate's percentage of the counted vote. If, though, a candidate's vote share is padded by adding ballots in otherwise low turnout districts, estimates of a will turn negative and estimates of b increase until, in extreme cases, it exceeds 1.0 (e.g., upwards of 1.6 in places like Russia's Tatarstan). The operant clause here, though, is ''in otherwise homogeneous data'' since this indicator is intended to detect the heterogeneity introduced by fraud. Any preexisting heterogeneity can only distort our conclusions and it is essential that we control for those other parameters that might intervene between turnout and candidate preference. Knowing what these things might be-regional loyalties, ethnic identities, or differences in voting patterns between urban and rural voters-is where substantive expertise enters and belies a blind application of this indicator.
To illustrate things further, we note that if, after separating Republican from Democratic precincts (since these subsets are on average demographically distinct), we apply Sobyanin's second indicator to data from Cuyahoga (Cleveland) or Franklin (Columbus) counties Ohio, nothing hinting at fraud appears. But if we do the same for Hamilton County (Cincinnati), it would seem that significant fraud has occurred in every presidential election beginning with 1992 (Myagkov et al. 2009, see especially 257-65) . It is unreasonable to suppose, though, that fraud of the magnitude suggested by a blind application of this indicator has gone unnoticed through five presidential elections. But there is an innocuous explanation-the Republican precincts in Cincinnati itself that are demographically distinct from those in the suburbs-districts that vote Republican by slim margins and with considerably lower rates of turnout than other districts. Thus, merely separating precincts by party preference is a poor control for demographic heterogeneity in the country and results in a false signal of fraud (for a similar example in Taiwan owing to military districts and districts with heavy concentrations of ''aboriginal populations'' see Chaing and Ordeshook 2009) .
To suppose that Benford's Law or any proposed indicator can avoid these methodological complexities is unwarranted. A valid analysis, regardless of the forensic tool proposed, must include a model that either specifies the generalized impact of parameters such as district magnitude, competitiveness, and regional clustering of support or it must give us sound theoretical arguments for supposing that those parameters will not impact our conclusions. Thus, even if there are those who reject the inference drawn from our analysis-that Benford's Law is irrelevant to assessing an election's conformity with good democratic practice and that effort should be directed elsewhere in the search for forensic indicators-we cannot escape the conclusion that any future development of that Law's application to elections must necessarily identify likely intervening variables with their impact on digit distributions adjusted in a theoretically proscribed way. 
